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PUTTING EQUITY BACK IN REVERSE MORTGAGES

Putting Equity
Back in Reverse
Mortgages:
Helping Seniors
Retire with Dignity
by Andrew C. Helman

Policymakers can help some seniors age in place
through policies to strengthen private-sector reverse
mortgages. In reverse mortgages, individuals who
may be “house rich but cash poor” can use their
home’s equity to receive regular income or get
money through a credit line. Andrew Helman
argues that state legislatures can help seniors avoid
the “tricks and traps” of reverse mortgages by establishing programs in which lenders who agree to
play by rules that ensure the safety and security of
such mortgages are placed on a “preferred” list for
seniors seeking a loan. He observes that laying the
groundwork now can help a larger group of seniors
age with dignity.
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PUTTING EQUITY BACK IN REVERSE MORTGAGES

…the reverseWe should provide for our age, in order that
our age may have no urgent wants of this
world to abstract it from the meditations of
the next. It is awful to see the lean hands of
Dotage making a coffer of the grave!
—Edward Bulwer, Lord Lytton (Bulwer 2006)
INTRODUCTION

A

s the great recession continues to linger, financial
pressures are putting the squeeze on Maine seniors
for basic needs such as gas, groceries, and medical
expenses (Morin and Taylor 2009). And retirement
for baby boomers is right around the corner, even as
their parents’ wealth evaporates. Given these realities,
Maine, like many other states, is at a crossroads: How
do policymakers ensure seniors retire with dignity in
spite of a down economy, evaporating wealth, and
diminished resources for social welfare programs?
Given emerging data showing that the vast
majority of seniors would prefer to age in place (Bayer
and Harper 2009), one option some seniors will likely
consider is a reverse mortgage. Reverse mortgages are
rising debt/falling equity mortgages through which
seniors can turn the equity in their homes into a stream
of cash or credit line. In light of recent reports of fraud
and abuse with reverse-mortgage transactions, however,
significant reforms are needed to make reverse mortgages safe and secure for seniors.
This essay will discuss tricks and traps1 plaguing
reverse mortgages along with concrete steps that can
be taken at the state level to remedy the problem for
Maine seniors. While the private and public sectors
are both able to help cash-strapped seniors, this essay
argues that the reverse-mortgage market presents an
option that is likely to become more popular and,
therefore, would benefit from consumer-protection
reforms. The basic premise is that legislators could
induce private-sector lenders to agree to lend on
terms that are free from common tricks and traps
in exchange for placing lenders participating in this
program on a preferred list that would be maintained
by the appropriate state agency such as MaineHousing.
Seniors would benefit from safe and secure loans, while
lenders would benefit from the imprimatur of state

government when accessing this
largely untapped market.
THE SCOPE OF THE
PROBLEM

M

mortgage market
presents an option
that is likely to

any seniors face a threebecome more
fold problem. First, for
the vast majority of seniors,
popular and, therewealth tends to be tied up in
the equity of their homes
fore, would benefit
(Hammond 1993). As a result,
much of their financial resources
from consumerare in the form of an illiquid
asset that is often unable to
protection reforms.
produce income—a problem
compounded by the fact that
seniors have higher rates of
homeownership than other age
groups (U.S. Census Bureau 2005). Yet, at the same
time, housing costs are seniors’ largest expenditure
(Loonin and Renuart 2007). Second, according to an
article in the July 2, 2008, issue of USA Today by
Lynn O’Shaughnessy, expenses for necessary items such
as food, fuel, and medicine “have galloped beyond
reach,” and many seniors are “living on fixed incomes”
and “just getting crushed on food and medicine that
they can’t do without.” Third, incomes tend to be lower
for those over 65 years old, and about 75 percent of all
seniors have incomes below $33,000 (DeNavas-Walt,
Proctor and Smith 2009; Purcell 2009). For seniors,
lower incomes make it especially difficult to keep up
with rising expenses such as property taxes, which tend
to increase as property values go up, because seniors’
incomes usually do not rise correspondingly (Loonin
and Renuart 2007).
Unfortunately, there is every reason to believe
that we are looking at the tip of the iceberg (Brandon
2008). On one hand, “the population of seniors will
increase 35 percent to nearly 55 million by 2020”
(Salkin 2009: 292). On the other hand, from October
2007 to October 2008, retirement accounts lost
between $1.6 and $2 trillion, which will disproportionately affect baby boomers nearing retirement
because they have less time to recover their wealth
(Brandon 2008).
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On top of that, according to an article in Baby
Boomer Magazine (www.babyboomer-magazine.com/
news/119/ARTICLE/1108/2009-02-10.html) many
boomers can expect smaller inheritances because the
generation before them is living longer and also has
been hit hard by the current financial crises. And that
does not take into consideration that many boomers
expect retirement to be more active than the preceding
generation, which means their expenses will likely be
about 15 percent higher.
Taken together, the problem stands in stark relief.
The current group of seniors is “sitting on a large
amount of home equity,” but face trouble making ends
meet (Loonin and Renuart 2007: 180). The baby
boomers, who are rapidly approaching retirement,
are facing diminished retirement savings due to the
economic downturn and have no substantial hope of
being bailed out by inheritances from their parents.

Given the relatively high rates of home
ownership and stagnant or declining
incomes among seniors, many “face the
dilemma of being ‘house rich, but cash
poor’” (Hammond 1993: 76).

MAINE’S FAILED PUBLIC SECTOR SOLUTION

P

olicymakers in Maine have tried to help seniors
cope with financial stress in the past (L.D. 1088,
Statement of Fact [114th Legis. 1989]; House Amend.
H to Comm. Amend. A. to L.D. 1088, No. H-388
[114th Legis. 1989]; Legis. Rec. 1890 [1989]). In
1989, the legislature enacted the Elderly Tax Deferral
Program, which called on state government to pay local
property taxes for some low-income seniors in exchange
for liens on the seniors’ homes that were enforceable
upon transfer of the property or death of the senior.2
But due to the costs, the program proved to be unsustainable, and for the same reason, efforts to revive it
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have mostly stalled (David Ledew, personal communication). While the state has recouped virtually all of the
money invested in the program, it tied up scarce
resources that could have been directed to other
programs, and it essentially put the state in the business
of lending, which the private sector may be better
equipped to do.
The details of the program were fairly simple. For
seniors who met eligibility criteria—at a minimum, 65
years old and earning less than $32,000 a year—Maine
state government picked up the municipal property
taxes, which allowed the senior to defer payment. In
exchange for accepting the state’s help, seniors agreed to
repay the amount of money advanced plus interest,
which was set at six percent per year. Four major classes
of events triggered a repayment obligation: death of the
participant; sale of the property; the participant moved
for reasons other than health; or the property, such as a
mobile home, was removed from the state.
The state secured its interest by recording a lien
on the property. If the state did not recoup its money
by April 30 of the year after the repayment obligation
matured, the lien was treated as a mortgage with
priority above all other encumbrance. While the program provided for a non-judicial foreclosure process, the
state only foreclosed on one property in the program’s
history (David Ledew, personal communication).
Despite the program’s modest enrollment—for
example, 73 participants in year one, 90 in year four,
and about 175 at the program’s height—the legislature
quickly became concerned about the growing cost of
the program (David Ledew, personal communication).
Thus, the legislature authorized the state tax assessor to
pay less than the total amount due to municipal taxing
authorities, which, to many people, signaled a lack
of confidence in the program (David Ledew, personal
communication). However, the real death knell came
a few years later, in the wake of a fiscal crisis that led
to a shutdown of state government in 1991 (David
Ledew, personal communication). In 1994, as part of
a supplemental budget bill, the legislature established
a retroactive moratorium on new claims under the
program. There was no floor debate or discussion in
the press of this issue.
Recently, Rep. Kathleen Chase (R-Wells),
attempted to breathe new life into the Elderly Tax
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Deferral Program, but she was unable to win support
from the legislature’s Taxation Committee because of
the cost of the program, even though she proposed
raising the minimum age for participation to 70 (David
Ledew, personal communication). Rep. Chase’s effort
was not entirely without success, however. The Taxation
Committee amended her proposal and voted to allow
municipalities to establish optional tax-deferral
programs based on guidelines that are similar to the
Elderly Tax Deferral Program (Comm. Amend. A. to
L.D. 1121 [124th Legis. 2010]). But even this modest
proposal may be a questionable use of public resources.
It would tie up millions in scarce public resources; it
could give lenders cold feet and add to borrowing costs;
and it would likely add to administrative costs for
enforcement proceedings.
A PRIVATE SECTOR SOLUTION

The Options

Given the relatively high rates of home ownership
and stagnant or declining incomes among seniors,
many “face the dilemma of being ‘house rich, but cash
poor’” (Hammond 1993: 76). The private sector,
however, provides seniors with different ways to turn
locked-up equity into cash through sales, sale-leasebacks, retaining a life estate, a support mortgage,
or a reverse mortgage (Nelson and Whitman 1994;
Hammond 1993; Thompson v. Glidden, 445 A.2d 676
[Me. 1982]). There are distinct advantages and disadvantages to each, especially for homeowners in states
with housing costs similar to Maine, where the median
sale price for a home in 2008 was $178,000, and the
average monthly rent for a two bedroom apartment in
the same year was $846.95.3
A sale is “the most obvious way for the elderly
homeowner to convert home equity to an incomeproducing use” (Hammond 1993: 79). A homeowner
can then invest the proceeds to generate income, or
simply live off of the sale proceeds and buy or rent less
expensive housing (Hammond 1993). Based on the
2008 median sale price and monthly rent for Maine,
a senior would need to realize a return of 5.7 percent
from investing the proceeds of a sale in order to cover
rent—and that does not account for investment

expenses or any return to principal needed to hedge
against a further decline in the financial markets.
Given that seniors have a relatively short time horizon
for investing, however, their corresponding risk tolerance should be low, which rules out stocks and leaves
as investment options cash, cash equivalents, or
bonds. Yet, current interest rates are too low to
generate the levels of income needed from cash, cash
equivalents, or bonds.
Sale-leaseback transactions present another option,
but they are often complex to navigate. In a sale-leaseback, a homeowner sells the house to an investor, often
a family member, who then leases the home back to the
senior (Hammond 1993). The senior-seller usually gets
a down payment from the buyer, followed by monthly
principal and interest payments, which may be used to
offset payments due as a tenant (Hammond 1993).
These are complex transactions that could put seniors
in risky situations. For example, as tenants, seniors may
be vulnerable to evictions or unscrupulous and inattentive landlords. Additionally, seniors who finance the
sale-leasebacks themselves could be forced to take legal
action if payments are delinquent.
For those seniors with good family relations,
retaining a life estate or a support mortgage may be
viable options, though both have the potential to create
adversarial relationships with family members (Nelson
and Whitman 1994; Hammond 1993). Retaining a life
estate entails selling the right to possess and use the
property upon the senior’s death, while keeping an
ownership interest for the remainder of the senior’s life.
This option would almost certainly require legal assistance, thus adding to the transaction costs. A support
mortgage can be similarly complicated. Under this
option, a senior would sell his or her home, and the
buyer would grant a mortgage on the home to the
senior; if the buyer-mortgagor failed to provide support
for the senior-mortgagee, then the senior could foreclose upon the home. Even assuming the best of intentions, a support mortgage sets up a potentially
adversarial relationship among family members.
Complicating any analysis is the fact that,
according to a recent AARP survey, about 84 percent
of those 55 or older want to age in place and stay in
their homes if that is possible (Bayer and Harper
2000). In fact, the data strongly suggest that “the desire
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to remain in their current residence for as long as
possible” is “more prevalent as age increases” (Bayer and
Harper 2000: 25). About 82 percent of survey respondents would prefer to have help given to them in their
current home, if it eventually becomes necessary, as
opposed to moving to a skilled nursing facility or
moving to a friend’s or relative’s home (Bayer and
Harper 2000). Moreover, of the roughly 30 percent
of survey respondents who said they do not expect
to stay at home, 72 percent made no plans for when
that day arrives—a statistic that seems to have held
steady over more than a decade of repeated surveys
(Bayer and Harper 2000).
For those seniors wishing to stay in their homes,
reverse mortgages present a viable alternative, in part
because the government and financial institutions have
helped to create financial products to fill this niche.
Broadly speaking, a reverse mortgage is a rising-debt/
falling-equity loan that “allows a homeowner to withdraw the equity in her home in the form of a loan with
a balance that increases rather than decreases over time”
(Nelson 2009: 340). In a typical reverse-mortgage
transaction, a homeowner can borrow money against
the equity in his or her home and does not have to
repay the loan until a triggering event occurs, such as
selling the home (Nelson 2009).
Scholars, news reports, and senior advocates,
however, have drawn attention to serious concerns
about predatory and abusive lending practices along
with significant costs associated with reverse mortgages
(Twomey and Jurgens 2009; Nelson 2009). According
to an article by Tara Siegel Bernard in the April 16,
2010, issue of The New York Times, some of the
concerns focus on the cost of origination fees, the cost
of insurance premiums designed to protect the lender
if the home value declines, and the impact on intergenerational wealth transfer.
With prodding from state policymakers, however,
reverse mortgages have the potential to be useful financial products that could help some seniors age in place.
The key is eliminating tricks and traps, so that seniors
and senior advocates can evaluate the financial costs
associated with reverse mortgages and make informed
decisions as to whether a reverse mortgage makes good
financial sense in any given situation.
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Reverse Mortgages and the Home Equity
Conversion Mortgage (HECM) Program

Reverse mortgages function like a mirror image of
traditional residential home loans. With a traditional
residential home loan, lenders typically make single,
lump-sum payments to borrowers at the beginning
of the loan term, and that money is often used to
purchase the property against which a mortgage is
granted (Nelson and Whitman 1994). This traditional
“forward mortgage,” or rising equity/falling debt, loan
is based on a borrower’s personal credit-worthiness,
personal guarantee, and projected income, which is
used to make payments throughout the life of the loan.
As the borrower makes payments under the terms of
a traditional forward loan—excluding, for example,
interest only loans, where borrowers’ payments only
cover the interest accruing—the amount of principle
owed will slowly decline, and the homeowner’s equity
in the property will increase.
In contrast, reverse mortgages are typically nonrecourse4, 5 loans secured by an elderly person’s primary
residence, and a balloon payment typically is not
required until a specified event occurs such as transfer,
death, or the senior moves out of the home permanently. Unlike traditional forward financing with
regular, even monthly payments made by the borrower
to the lender, reverse-mortgage lenders may make
regular monthly payments to the borrower that increase
the amount owed to the lender and are secured by the
collateralized property (Nelson and Whitman 1994).
To be eligible for insurance under the HECM program,
however, a mortgage loan must allow for payment
based on a line of credit, for a term set by the senior,
for the tenure of the senior’s ownership, or a mix of
monthly payments and a credit line. Additionally, the
lenders must allow the borrower to convert the method
of payment during the term of the mortgage.
Three ingredients helped to make reverse mortgages more popular and accessible. First, in 1998,
Congress made the Federal Housing Authority’s (FHA)
HECM program permanent (Nelson 2009). Second,
“Fannie Mae established a secondary market for home
equity conversion mortgages, which by increasing
liquidity, helped increase the number of lenders willing
to provide home equity conversion mortgages” (Nelson

View current & previous issues of MPR at: mcspolicycenter.umaine.edu/?q=MPR

PUTTING EQUITY BACK IN REVERSE MORTGAGES

2009: 340). Third, in 2006, the first reverse-mortgagebacked securities entered the market, with two private
securitizations (Nelson 2009). Additionally, at the
beginning of October 2006, Ginnie Mae announced
that it also intended offer securities backed by
FHA-approved reverse mortgages (www.ginniemae.gov/
news2006/10-17presshud.asp?Section=Media).
Today, the bulk of all reverse-mortgage loans—
about 90 percent—are insured by FHA and must meet
the administration’s standards for participation in the
HECM program (Nelson 2009; Redfoot, Scholen and
Brown 2007). FHA’s standards are set by statute and
rule and include lengthy requirements for borrowers
and lender-loan originators, otherwise the loans cannot
be insured by FHA . Under these guidelines, for
example, the loan originator must be approved by the
HUD Secretary, and mortgagors or the mortgagor’s
spouse must be at least 62 years old. Additionally,
in terms of programmatic substance, a loan is only
eligible to be insured by FHA if it meets consumer
protection standards prescribed by statute. For example,
the senior-mortgagor must receive counseling from
an independent third party without an interest in
the transaction along with a disclosure of all costs.
Moreover, prepayment must be accepted without
penalty; the loans must be nonrecourse, which means
homeowners are not personally liable for the difference
between the amount of indebtedness under the mortgage and the amount the mortgagee recovers at the
time the mortgage is discharged; lenders must allow
homeowners to select the way they wish to receive their
distributions, whether in the form of a line of credit,
on a monthly basis, or on some other basis; and mortgagees must allow mortgagors to convert the method of
payment. Similarly, homeowners must be guaranteed
payment, even if the lender defaults; lenders must agree
to adhere to caps on origination fees of $6,000; and
lenders must put firewalls in place so that loan originators have no financial incentive to provide other financial or insurance products.

Tricks and Traps

In the past few years, the reverse-mortgage
industry has earned bad press for predatory practices.
Some of the criticism has centered around poor adherence to pre-borrowing counseling standards set by

FHA, concerns about fraud by individuals and predatory practices within the industry, and misleading
marketing. As a result, leading senior advocacy organizations, such as AARP, have issued strong warnings
against reverse mortgages. Bluntly put, AARP said:
“A word of caution to older Americans considering
reverse mortgages: Tread carefully” (Fleck 2009).
Counseling is an important safeguard to inform
seniors and help them to steer clear of transactions that
may not be in their best interest. In June 2009,
however, The General Accounting Office (GAO)
cautioned Congress that “HUD’s internal controls do
not provide reasonable assurance that counseling
providers are complying with HECM counseling”
requirements (Scirè 2009). An undercover investigation
by GAO revealed that nearly half of the counselors
failed to cover all of the topics required by HUD, such
as other financial products and options that could be
a better fit for some seniors, and some counselors
misstated the length of the counseling sessions in their
officially filed records (Scirè 2009).

With prodding from state policymakers…
reverse mortgages have the potential
to be useful financial products that
could help some seniors age in place.
Fraud and predatory practices continue to be a
problem in the industry, garnering headlines in newspapers and cautions from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). For example, according to an
article by Anne Tergesen in the August 27, 2009, issue
of The Wall Street Journal, a Florida mortgage broker
scammed seniors out of about $1 million by diverting
money that should have gone to repay their conventional forward loans as part of reverse mortgage refinance transactions. Similarly, in a March 2009 bulletin,
the FBI cautioned that “unscrupulous loan officers,
mortgage companies, investors, loan counselors,
appraisers, builders, developers, and real estate agents
are exploiting Home Equity Conversion Mortgages
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(HECMs) . . . to defraud senior citizens” (Federal
Bureau of Investigation 2009: 1). Scholars and
consumer advocates believe the problem extends
beyond a few bad apples (Nelson 2009; Twomey and
Jurgens 2009). With the economic downturn, “[s]ome
lenders view reverse mortgages as a replacement for
subprime lending as a new way to generate revenue”
(Nelson 2009: 360). In fact, “[m]any of the same
players that fueled the subprime mortgage boom—
ultimately with disastrous consequences—have turned
their attention to the reverse market” (Twomey and
Jurgens 2009: 1). Considering that the penetration of
reverse mortgages as a product is about one percent of
its potential market, lenders “forecast tremendous
growth due to the 10,000 baby-boomers turning sixtytwo every day” (Nelson 2009: 360-361).
Furthermore, misleading advertising also plagues
the industry (Scirè 2009). GAO found that lenders and
HUD use broad language that can mislead seniors
about the security of their homes or misrepresent
reverse mortgages as a government benefit program,
rather than a private sector lending option (Scirè 2009).

…state legislatures have an opportunity to establish programs in which
lending institutions that agree to play
by newly established rules aimed at
ensuring reverse-mortgage loans are
safe and secure could be placed on a
list of preferred lenders provided to
seniors seeking a loan.
Making Reverse Mortgages Safe and Secure

Despite the concerns discussed above, the reversemortgage market is expected to grow significantly over
the next decade (Nelson 2009). The anticipated growth
of this market presents an opportunity to transform
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home equity conversion products into safe and secure
borrowing options for seniors, the vast majority of
whom would prefer to age in their homes (Bayer and
Harper 2000).
Broadly speaking, state legislatures have an opportunity to establish programs in which lending institutions that agree to play by newly established rules
aimed at ensuring reverse-mortgage loans are safe and
secure could be placed on a list of preferred lenders
provided to seniors seeking a loan. Those rules could
require, for example, strong consumer protection standards, a ban on yield spread premiums, a suitability
analysis, a “lite” product geared toward property taxes,
prohibitions on inappropriate cross-selling of annuities
and other financial or insurance products, and a private
right of action for damages plus attorneys fees for violations of the program rules. For the vast majority of
reverse-mortgage loans, these state standards could
wrap around the basic requirements of FHA’s HECM
program.
Seniors would benefit from reverse mortgages
provided by known lenders that agree to make sure
their products meet these standards. Lenders would
benefit from the imprimatur of the state government
or agency administering the program and easy access to
the expanding market of seniors. States would benefit
by directing private resources to a problem that has
beguiled legislators.
Among the many possible directions to go, here
are a few recommendations that could form the basis
of a discussion:
1. Require participating lenders to meet tough
consumer protection standards. Ideally,
HECM program standards could serve as a
starting point to this discussion, especially
because about 90 percent of the reverse-mortgage market already adheres to FHA’s standards in order to benefit from insured loans.
There would be several advantages to using
HECM’s standards as a starting point. First,
consumers would be guaranteed that FHA will
step in to provide performance if the lender
defaults, and the lender would have a guarantee of a minimum return on its investment,
in case real estate prices drop. Second, while
GAO certainly raised valid concerns about
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HUD’s counseling requirement, the existence
of the requirement benefits consumers and
adherence can be improved through separate
state standards or inducements. For example,
the legislature could demonstrate how seriously it takes strict adherence to this requirement by suspending any lender making loans
despite knowing that counseling was insufficient for a particular loan. This could be
ensured by requiring loan originators to ask
targeted questions for data collection about the
substance of the counseling actually received
and submit that paperwork to the state oversight agency for auditing purposes. Third, the
program has reasonable caps on origination
fees, and the legislature could always tighten
these standards. Fourth, lenders are subject to
substantial disclosure requirements, such as
Truth in Lending.
However, HECM standards may not be
appropriate in all instances. For example,
current program standards limit the maximum
amount a senior can borrow to $625,000.
Requiring strict adherence to the program’s
standards would leave some asset-rich seniors
out in the cold. But this may be a largely illusory problem in states like Maine, where the
median sale price for a home in 2008 was
$178,000.
2. Require lenders or broker-originators to
engage in a suitability analysis for reverse
mortgages. Arguably, seniors are in need of
protection in a reverse-mortgage transaction.
Seniors are considered to be more likely the
victims of financial fraud or abuse, and the
complexities of the transactions can be difficult
to navigate (www.fbi.gov/majcases/fraud/
seniorsfam.htm). Many brokers and lenders
are trained to emphasize “the importance of
building trust with potential customers”
(Twomey and Jurgens 2009: 19). Because
reverse mortgages are business deals “where
each party ostensibly protects his or her own
economic interests, in many states brokers and
lenders owe no fiduciary duty to borrowers,

and when problems arise brokers and lenders
disavow any relationship of trust and confidence with borrowers” (Twomey and Jurgens
2009: 19).
Requiring a suitability analysis would address
some of these issues. A suitability analysis
would establish “[a] standard of conduct that
would require brokers and lenders to have
reasonable grounds for believing that a reverse
mortgage is suitable for the borrower”
(Twomey and Jurgens 2009: 19). Consumer
advocates have argued that it “is necessary to
counteract market forces that favor profitability over responsible lending” (Twomey
and Jurgens 2009: 19). Imposing a suitability
analysis requirement emerged as a significant
recommendation of the National Consumer
Law Center and AARP for making the reversemortgage market safe (Twomey and Jurgens
2009; Redfoot, Scholen and Brown 2007).
The use of a suitability analysis is well-established in securities law, imposing a duty on a
securities broker only to sell securities that are
suitable based on the buyer’s financial wherewithal, tax status, overall investment objectives, and other factors (Hirsch 2008). But the
use of a suitability analysis is only now gaining
traction in the area of mortgage law due to the
subprime mortgage meltdown (Hirsch 2008).
3. Require appraisals conducted for reverse
mortgages to be truly independent. To avoid
inflated values and abuse of the borrowinglending process, it would be wise to require
truly independent value appraisals for loans
originated through this program. Doing so
would remove another recently emerging area
of fraud in the reverse-mortgage market:
instances where speculators buy properties at
low prices and, using inflated appraisals, sell
them to seniors willing to take out a reverse
mortgage as part of the transaction.
A cost-effective way to tackle this issue would
be to have the agency administering this
program maintain a list of appraisers. During
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the application process, the lender or
borrower could call the agency, which could
then dispatch an appraiser directly to the
property. The basic idea is to remove control
in selecting appraisers from lenders. While
appraisers are typically paid by and work for
borrowers, as a de facto matter, lenders and
broker-originators often set up the appraisal,
which leads to an informal business incentive
to keep the lender happy.
4. Ban bonus payments to brokers for steering
seniors to loans with interest rates higher
than they could obtain. Yield-spread
premiums are payments from lenders to
brokers “in exchange for the broker selling
the borrower a loan with a higher interest
rate than the borrower could have received”
(Twomey and Jurgens 2009: 19). As it
currently stands, neither HUD nor Congress
have banned yield-spread premiums in the
HECM program. Simply put, yield-spread
premiums should be prohibited because they
are an unscrupulous practice, especially in a
market made up of seniors.
5. Create a “lite” reverse-mortgage product
specifically geared toward property taxes.
This suggestion would target one of the
chronic complaints of many homeowners—
that property taxes are too high for seniors
to remain in their homes. A limited or “lite”
product could be created with a streamlined
application process, reduced origination fees,
and an explicit requirement for quick and easy
pay-off. Doing so would help seniors get
targeted relief for property taxes, which could
be made even more effective if lenders offer
to escrow property taxes for borrowers. This
suggestion would build on one of the key
recommendations of AARP (Redfoot, Scholen
and Brown 2007).
6. Prohibit the sale of annuities, insurance, or
other similar financial products; prohibit
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directing borrowers to other services where
the broker, lender, or an affiliate would
gain, directly or indirectly, in conjunction
with a reverse-mortgage transaction. Mostly,
this is a belt-and-suspenders approach to
piggy-back on recent changes to the HECM
program. A state legislature, however, could
expand the prohibition so that lenders,
brokers, or their affiliates would be banned
from directing borrowers to contractors or
purveyors of other services, if the lender,
broker, or an affiliate would gain financially.
At its core, the motivating principle is that
brokers and lenders should not gain from a
transaction in which they help seniors tap into
the equity of their homes only to redirect it
back to themselves or an affiliate.
7. Require adherence to advertising regulations aimed at eliminating misleading
advertising. As mentioned above, GAO identified six commonly appearing misleading
claims in reverse-mortgage advertising materials. Lenders participating in this program
should forgo all misleading advertising and
claims, or lose their status as a preferred lender.
To help with enforcement of this requirement,
the agency administering the program could
be authorized to deal with complaints of
misleading advertising administratively, subject
of course to judicial review.
8. Lenders that are the subject of repeated
substantiated complaints resulting in findings of program violations or other evidence
impugning trustworthiness lose their
preferred status. This suggestion is aimed at
providing recourse against a lender that flouts
program regulations either as a matter of
policy or as a result of a few bad apples. The
carrot extended to lenders is participation as
a preferred lender. If lenders fail to adhere to
the program’s guidelines, they should lose the
benefit of that status.
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9. Provide the appropriate agencies with
enforcement power as well as authorize
a private right of action with the lender/
broker paying attorney fees for the borrower
if they are found to have preyed upon a
senior. This suggestion is a counter-point to
(8) and serves as the stick. For consumer
protection laws to be effective, there must be a
punishment for action that harms consumers.
With that in mind, legislatures should consider
providing the appropriate agencies with
enforcement powers to seek civil or even criminal penalties if conduct by lenders warrants it.
Consumers should also be empowered to bring
actions, with the lender bearing the cost if it
turns out the lender has violated program rules
and brought harm to the consumer. For
example, in Maine, the state’s Unfair Trade
Practices Act provides a ready legal rubric
within which these goals could be achieved,
and it would be worth considering whether
the most effective approach would be to deem
violations of the reverse-mortgage program
violations of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices
Act, or a similar statute in another state.
Even if reverse mortgages can be successfully
reformed to eliminate tricks and abusive practices,
there are significant limitations to the product in the
context of a broader analysis for seniors. Seniors, advocates, and those helping seniors through these decisions
should give serious consideration to all available alternatives, especially when there are family members who
could help to facilitate other alternatives. The New
York Times article by Bernard provides an example of
how to analyze whether a reverse mortgage makes sense
in a given financial situation (www.nytimes.
com/2010/04/17/your-money/mortgages/17money.
html?8dpc).
CONCLUSION

the Elderly Tax Deferral Program, but it lacked staying
power, in part because it tied up significant resources.
And recent efforts aimed at reviving the program—
even with a higher minimum age for eligibility—
demonstrate that policymakers are less than excited
about the prospect of committing substantial public
resources to this problem.

Whether now or later, state policymakers will be faced with the daunting
task of planning for the support of
an aging population.
That leaves the private sector, and state legislatures
have a unique opportunity to help shape market forces
so that seniors are offered a safe and secure financial
product. Given the overwhelming desire of most
seniors to remain in their homes, one way to guide the
market would be for state legislatures to offer to place
reverse-mortgage lenders on a preferred list if the
lenders agree to play by rules designed to ensure fair
transactions for seniors. Those rules could include, for
example, tough consumer-protection standards, a ban
on yield-spread premiums, a suitability analysis, a “lite”
product geared toward property taxes, prohibitions on
inappropriate cross-selling of annuities or other financial products, a private right of action for damages plus
attorneys fees for violations of the program rules, along
with the other suggestions discussed in this article.
Whether now or later, state policymakers will be
faced with the daunting task of planning for the
support of an aging population. By taking active steps
now to get in front of the problem before it grows
further, policymakers will be laying the groundwork for
a larger group of seniors to age with dignity. -

M

aine, like many states, is at a crossroads when it
comes to policy options to help cash-strapped
seniors. Maine tried a public sector solution through
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